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Liberal intellectuals in the West as a rule did not particularly
appreciate Nato or other military alliances. At best, they
grudgingly conceded it a limited usefulness in a bi-polar Cold War
world. More recently, they happily hope to see it go away, along
. wi th the Warsaw Pact, as tensions receded, as the Cold War was
finally and officialljT declared over on many occasions this past
year and definitively at Paris in November, 1990, and as a happy
newage of peace and cooperation appears to dawn on the horizon.
To reflect on a future role for Nato is now being considered
unworthy, a detraction of precious resources from nobler' causes.
I. Nature of the Problem
Quite obviously there are many serious reasons today for
questiolling Nato's legitimacjt, its ver~y' raison d'etre. 1 T11ejr ha,"e
their basis in all those s teps beginning wi th t11e 1985 sl.lmmi t
meeting which at an accelerating pace led to mutual solemn pledges
by Eas t and Wes t abou t ending old enmi ties , promises of non-
aggression, cooperation and good ~ill at the CSCE meeting in Paris
in November, 1990, particularly the Joint Declaration of all
Warsaw Pact and Nato States arid the all-CSCE Paris Charter;2 the
beginning phase-out of Soviet troops from East and Central Europe
which will ~nd in Germany by 1994; and the impending dissolution
of the Warsaw Pact as a mili tary organization. 3 The big mili tar~{
threat of' all-out aggression by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact Organization (WPO) against the West through Central Europe
has, for all practical purposes, disappeared. Even representatives
of the most inveterate mili tary viewpoint concede this much. 4
Whether Nato was responsible for the "Long Peace" in Europe since
1949 5 we do not know and may never know. Did the Soviet Union (with
help of the WPO) ever want and intend to attack? But that is quite
beside our point here. Nato was and is primarily a classical
alliance designed to deter aggression by a defined external
enemy.6 Wi th that threa t gone -. is Nato to follow? Even i ts
Secretary General has seriously di~cussed the question - though of
course he has denied it. 7
2On the most general level one might argue with Fukuyama8 that if
"the end of history" is upon us, i.e. if the stormy contests of
the past have produced a tranquil sea of boundless liberalism, we
could dispense with further precautions against traditional
"accidents of history" . But one can hardly take seriously this
(inverted) Marxist (or Hegelian) model turned te obvious political
purposes. In Stanley Hoffmann's words it is "a silly notion based
on aseries of mistaken assumptions .. 9
In summary, the answer to the question - disseIve Nato? - would
have to be an unqualified yes were the situation as simple or one-
dimensional as suggested by these propositions. And precisely
because the si tua tion has become complex, fluid, and haz~l there
are already those who begin to develop nostalgie memories of the
Cold War as a stable because neatly divided world. 9a
The real issue iso first in terms of elassical alliance thinking:
has the threat been ·transformed, or are there other threats which
justify its eontinued existence? Second, has Nato brollght forth
other achievements which are worth preserving and which might be
jeopardized by its demise?
11. Transformation of the Threat
The one big threat is gone or very remote - but transformed and
new kinds of threat persist.
1. East - West Context: The Soviet Union
Any arnount of legitimate criticism can be raised against the
arguments that follow: that they reveal timidity, pessimism,
short-sightedness, a regressive mind-set molded by cold-war
experience,10 etc. etc. Granted all that and more - we still
persist in presenting the argument. There may be no immediate
classic mili tary threa t from the Soviet Union which is beset .by
economic, political, ethnic-nationalist problems which threaten
. its very existence as a unified state. Much as we wish the politi-
cal and economic reform efforts of Perestroika every success -
primarily for the sake of the S"oviet peoples ~ for the·~ sake of
domestic Soviet and international peaee - the outeome is open in a
twofold sense".
a) The reform movemerttrnay succeed. It has been argued that it was
eeonomic neeessity arid other struetural problems which forced
President Gorbaehev to emphasize disarmament, to abandon the
Breschnjew Doetrine and dismantle the Soviet Empi~~, to open the
Soviet Union to western values (plus capital, aid, know-how). But
then, upon the logie of this argument: the Soviet' Union might
revert to antagonistic polieies after domestic restabilization -
unless, of course, she will have been transformed in that process.
The latter negative condition is the big unknown. And both condi-
tions begin toappear more and more unlikely. Is it an irresponsi-
ble cold-war mind-set which provides for this possibility?
b) If Perestroika fails or takes too lang for people or the mili-
tary to wait it is not difficult to design sc~narios of eeonomic
or administrative chaos or the autbreak of nationalist antagonisms
leading to the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. History is
certainly not devoid of examples where the explosive energies
building up in tl1is kind of situation ha\ie been di\Terted to,~ards
external targets by skilfull politieal manipulators, be they
eentral or loeal leaders. And their powers of persuasion or
wreckage may be wonder-fully enhanced by the availability of far-
reaching weapons systems - not a very eomforting idea in a situa-
ti011 of chaos. And even wi thout ffillCh conseious manipl.lla tion the
mere (and likely) outbreak of violence may draw third states in
and thus escalate into major hostilities. This is a threat which
cannot be taken lightly, even without a WPO, because
c) the Soviet Union remains, after the United States, and certain-
l~{ in relation to all othe·r including East European states, the
onl~{ \,,·orld super power, in terms of conventional land, sea, air
forees - not to speak of nuclear warheads and delivery s~{stems.
This fact may be an argument per se. But it assumes even greater
force in combina tion lii t11 points a) and b). The danger of this
potential being used for a major invasion of or threat towards
Wes tern Europe ma~{ be highl~· unlikel~·~. Bu t i t is not entireliT
unconeeivable that future Soviet leaders might think of ~mploying
i t in order to rebuild their now-lost East Europe'an emp·ire. Such.
an attempt could easily lead to a major conflict invo.lving all
Europe and North America.
2. Central and Eastern Europe
All nations of this area are facing huge structural problems
resul ting from poli tical and economic reforms and high expecta-
tions which cannot be fulfilled quickly enough. They are compound-
ed in some cases - results of repeated political reshufflings in
the course of history - by na tionalist or ethnic minori ty con-
flicts which lead to irredentist claims for \7arying degrees of
autonomy, for the redrawing of borders, transfer of terri tories
(even if in this con text the German ease has ceas'ed to an immedi-
a te iSStle). Suppressed forcefully over decades - i. e. not sub-
jected or made amenable to rational and openly discussed attempts
ta 501v'e them - they are' now coming into the open abruptl~l and
disruptively. Local ethnic minori ties may not per se be able to
throw Europe into chaos. But the danger of loeal conflict produc-
ing a chain reaction which might draw in major actors is not en-
tirely far-fetched. Greetings fram Sarajevo.
3. South-North Threats
A far greater danger to Nato countries may result from third-area
conflicts and may lead to a shift in Nato's major conflict orien-
tation from East-West towards North-South. Whether technically an
adaptation of the wording of the North Atlantic Treat~r is nece~­
sary for Nato to deal directly with these issues is not our con-
cern here. That is the nature of the transformed threat. Northern
Africa, the Near and Middle East might be a case in point. A num-
ber of factors combine to create potentially dangerous situations
which will affect the immediate Nato area directly or indirectly.
We only mention a few without elaborating further: The population
explosion (e. g. Egypt nOli has 53 million people and by the year
2025 will have ane hundred million; the Maghreb area had 20 mil-
lion in 1950 and will grow to 140 million by 2025); inability of
regimes there to emp10y and feed these masses and to satisfy
quickly rising expectations; the- role and poli tical impact of
5fundamentalist Islam of the Irani type (which is active in many
countries e.g. Egypt); erratic leaders (Libya); at the same time
control over important raw materials (oil and ethers); local con-
flicts of which there is abundant supply: e.g. Iran-Iraq, Iraq-
Kuweit, Israel-Arab neighbors, etc.; and finally the proliferation
of highly sophisticated modern weapons, conventional but also in-
cluding A-B-C weapons of mass destruction and ever wider ranges
which are beceming cheaper and easier to produce or to buy. Sever-
al countries either already have them or have capabilities to pro-
duce them or have even used them (as Iraq has employed poison
gas) .11 - Interestingly, a Soviet general offered cooperation with
Nato in such an eventuality.12
To the extent then that Nato '.Jas not designed for one kind of
threat only - i.e. the massive Soviet invasion of Western Europe -
these are good arguments for maintaining some kind of Nato, even
if not necessarily the Nato as it has-developed to this day over
the last forty years. - But there are more arguments.
III. Achievements Worth Preserving
Ftlrther support for the argument in favor of a fllture role for
Nato derives fram certain achievements which Nato has brought
forth beyond the immediate security concerns vis-A-vis the Soviet
Union. Whatever the objective deterrent effect of Nato (which is
open ·to debate) - it was perceived subjectively in Western Europe
as a shield behind which the extraordinary peaceful creativi ty,
innovation, growth, expa~sion, conciliation (Germany and France
and other erstwhile enemies), and integration (economic and legal
more than political) could develop. In a sense Eastern Europe had
to bear the cost in termsof stagnation and non-development. Not
that Nato caused one or t!1.e other. But the objective collusion
between both blocs - even if unintentional - set the parameters
for developments on both sides.
1. It is not suggested here that the. West European "house" would
collapse with the removal of Nato. The link is a more indirect
one .. The American commitment to and ultimate guarantee of European
security through the North Atlanti~ Treaty and the resulting Nato,
6in a subtle and imperceptible way, transformed the West European
state system. The pre-Nato or pre-1945 system was agame for
lonely players. Ultimately and at the last moment of truth, every
s ta te alone was responsible for i ts own survival as against all
others. Occasional and shifting alliances did help in an unstable
way. Nato and the American security guarantee relieved West
European states of that responsibility. This arrangement set free
enormous energy and resources tradi tionall~{ absorbed by tha t re-
sponsibility (a performance repeated by each and every state).
They could now be devoted to the productive activities alluded to
above, and they did produce those remarkable results. This state
of affairs probably also prevented minor conflicts across the
East-West divide.
What will happen if Nato and the American guarantee were with-
dral~n? ~vill Europe - and that l~ould inevi tabI)' mean all Europe -
relapse into the instabl"e pre-1945 system of cut-throat competi-
tion?13 Stanley Hoffmann recently called such a suggestion an
insult to European intelligence. 14 Even if one cannot be quite so
sure everyone will, of course, share his hope {if not conviction}
that the fort~{-year process and practice of the new cooperativ"e
and integrative poli tics ha,"e so transformed the system i tself
that it can stand on its own feet and survive.
But even if the new West European system does prove vital enough -
it is not, by simple political and military arithmetic, a military
and even less a nuclear (super) power. In terms of (military) se-
curi t~{ i t i9 not even nt.ves tern Europe" bu t a loosely organized
collection of individual medium-size and small states. Should any
major threat recur or evolve as in any of the scenarios sketched
above, American security support, at least as a last resort, would
be indispensable for Europe to survive. The best, probably the
only way to organize this is through (~ - not necessaril:i" the)
Nato, certainly in the short- and medium-term perspective.
2. In this context another achievement of Nato, not altogether of
minor importance, has to be mentioned: The pressure for conflict
resolution through compromise which Nato as an institution has
brought to bear on all members fncluding the (inevitab:I.y) hege-
7monic power (USA) in this strongly asymmetrical securi ty rela-
tionship with its smaller European partners. This approach to
conflict resolution has become a matter of habit and routine.
3. The last and centrally important aspect is, .of course, Nato's
"double containment" i.e. of Germany.15 Without Germany Nato
would not have been possible as a practical concern. At the same
time, binding Germany into Nato reassured her neighbors, provided
the basis for Franco-German reconciliation, and made the German
potential (economic and otherwise) usable for dynamic and integra-
tive West European developments. If there is one constant in
Uni ted States foreign policy thinking since World War II it is the
fear of a neutral Germany vacillating unanchored between East and
West. German membership in Nato was the most convenient solution
for this dilemma, in 1954/55 just. as in 1990. And it even looked
for a while this past year as if Washington saw no other reason
for continuing Nato at all. 16 With regard to a unified German~r
this position was early supported by Warsaw and Prague and finally
though grudgingly accepted by Moscow, doubtless at some consider-
able psychological cost to the latter. - This alone would be one
of the strongest arguments for continuing Nato into the future.
Such arguments have indeed been advanced, without much cancern for
present political change in Europe or corresponding adaptation
within NATO, though less emphatically in Europe than in the United
States. 17
The paper might end here: a need for Nato's future can at least be
argued. But that leaves open what it should look like, particular-
ly in. view of changed East-West perspectives and their relations
to changes in and between Central and East European states not
covered by Nato~ The latter may and probably will 90ntinue. But in
order to su·rvive i twill have to accomoda te these changes.
IV. The United States, Europe, and Nato in a Changinq Securitv
Worldo
If the foregoing remarks support the continued existence of Nato
they do not require i ts exact p:r;esent structure. '~e ma~,P recall
that the latter integrated forces under American command
8developed only in response to the Korean War and is not identical
with the original North Atlantic Treaty which contains only rather
broad unspecific promises of support for western values, peaceful
resolution of conflicts and mutual help in case of aggression.
Any ever so tentative answers to the question regarding the future
role and shape of Nato in view of the changed and continually
changing international context will have to reflect three basic
issues: the relation between Europe and the Uni ted. States - do
they still need each other, why should they be concerned about
each other's security; and how should their future security
relationship (possibly within Nato) be structured. Finally, how do
the newly independent Central and East European states fit into
this picture; they increasingly demand security through a new role
either within or related to Nato or within an all~European securi-
ty system.
The United States began thinking "beyond containment" in the late
1980s. Secretary of State Baker reacted with his December 1989
speech in Berlin18 to events in Central and Eastern Europe and the
GDR that preceding fall. He proposed that Nato shift its emphasis
from military to political functions (an aspect which has recently
been exaggerated beyond Nato's constitutional capacity for action
in non-military political and other matters by its Secretary
General19 ); further , Na to should take advantage of the present
hopes for arms control, disarmament, verification, and confidence-
building by negotiating the necessary agreements with its counter-
part (WPO or Soviet Union) and then implementing them. His aim
clearly was to adjust Nato to new security conditions in Europe.
It was not in any sense to basically restructure Nato nor to
envision some entirely new securi ty system for Europe and the
North Atlantic area.
However, even if Nato continues to be needed these minor adapta-
tions may not suffice to accomodate the depth of recent changes in
East-West relationships which culminated in the Joint Declaration
of the twenty-two alliance states East and West, the Paris Charter
and the CFE treaty, all signed at the CSCE Paris meeting in
November 1990. The calls for new (all-}European securi)ty struc-
9tures are becoming louder. They would appear to demand new non-
confrontational models - if only because democratic societies, and
foremost among them the American, will not want any longer to pay
for the old ones.
The problem is cireular: Effective European defense needs the
United States; a firm U.S. eommitment is to Nato only"; Europe is
more than Nato; only the CSCE comprises all of Europe - plus the
Uni ted states and Canada; the Uni ted States has always refused
CSCE its full trust. 20
ThatEurbpe (except the Soviet Union) needs the United States for
i tsdefense (if defense is needed) is obvious. But why has the
United States committed itself to Europe's defense? President Bush
claimed that the United States is "a European power". That may be
exaggerating Ameriea's case but it is true in a vague.eultural and
historieal sense. In eeonomie terms I since the early post-World
War 11 period there has developed a genuine interdependence
(trade, investment) which today is stronger than ever before, i.e.
it makes the United States and Western Europe (EC) fully equal. In
poli tical and strategie terms I the American post-1945 commi tment
is basically the same which led to Uni ted States interventions in
two world wars: its interest to prevent the domination of Europe
by one hostile power. In the final analysis I American long-term
interest in Nato is in preserving the only structural and institu-
tional link whieh allows the Uni ted States to bring i ts power
(which is still hegemonie in this sphere) to bear upon securi ty
and hence poli tical' issues in Europe because the latter is and
remains (for the reasons just outlined) cri tically important to
the United States; and in order to prevent a situation fram aris-
ing which would, for the third time in this century, require U.S.
intervention for the protection of those interests. Domestically,
this commi tment may still be sustained in principle - but most
certainly only at considerably lower cost. In view of the huge
bUdget deficits and many urgent social problems the pressures !or
reallocation of resourees in the Uni ted Stat~s will therefore con-
tinue to rise and may become irresistible. In the coming decade
the U.S. will reduce its role to that of guarantor of last resort
~ l
for European security, particularly with its nuclear capabilities
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and perhaps symbolic troop dislocation in Europe. 21 That posture
is compatible with its own interest in Europe.
But how do the Central and East European States and their security
concerns, and fi;nally also the Soviet Union, fi t into this pic-
ture? It is this question that gives the issue its proper dimen-
sion. Simple accession of the WPO or rather its member states
(same - or all of them ?) to Nato even under presently favorable
condi tions is not exactly likely. This is no reali'stic option,
though also that has been discussed (possibly by the Soviet Union
more than by Nato) .
Various proposals have been advanced for adapting Nato, on the
basis of the interest configurations sketched above, to the new
and continually changing international context. Any quick basic
structural change i5 technically impossible. So i t will in any
case and for some time continue in its familiar ~hape.
v. Nato and the CSCE
The most radical solution would be soon to dissolve Nato and the
WPO and let CSCE take over their functions. Nato would only con-
tinue to exist in CSCE in a hegelian sense as aufgehoben. This,
however, is not a practical proposition, at least not for the time
being. 22 Promising as the CSCE process is - its weaknesses so far
in regard to hard policy issues are only too well-known.
If the CSCE process per se cannot easily or soon take over the
functions of Nato it is, as a little-structured process, compat-
ible with continued co-existence of Nato and ~vPO under its own
slowly evolving roof. 23 Few changes would be required. All
practical matters could be· negotiated with a long view between
both organizations. The CSCE process is distinguished by its
comprehensive membership, its openness, flexibility, utopian-
process character which does not attempt to preempt the future2~ -
and has barely been outlined by the Paris Charter. Nato offered to
change its strategy and deterrence doctrine at the London meeting
in July 1990: 25 to use nuclear w.eapons as last resort only (no
liberal first use); not to modernize the Lance missile and to
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negotiate short-range nuclear forces including nuclear artillery
shells; to back away from 'forward defense' and to restructure its
forces generally in favor of small mobile units - with the overall
objective of establishing aposture of structural incapacity for
·.aggression (or: non-provocative defense) .26 This arrangement might
weIl work in relation to the Soviet Union and Eastern/Central
Europe even if the WPO does not survive at least as a negotiating
partner for the kinds of agreements sketched out above.
By contrast, at present the weak link in this general arrangement
.would rather appear to be Nato itself. Its inner cohesion has been
called into question by its legitimacy crisis under the impact of
the end of the Cold War. Some distance and erosion of consensus
between the Uni ted States and Western Europe and of dome~tic sup-
port on both sides are unmistakable. And the conviction that re-
newable or transformed threa ts persis t, tha t in terdependence is
real, and tha t Europe and the Uni ted States need each other for
the defense of cornmon interests and values does not irnrnediately
help. Needed are new structures which reconcile not only these
diverging posi tions among each other but also wi th the changing
East-West relationship in Europe. In this sense Nato may serve as
a transitory element, as a bridge to that new structure to be
discarded once the latter has been reached. 27
VI. Nato as Bridge to a future European Security System: Alliance
Model Centered on Western Europe
Here the interpretation of the past becomes relevant for the fu-
ture. Na to' s 11 success 11 vis-a-vis the WPO has al ternatively been
viewed in the power or "realist" tradition as " v ictory" of Nato's
over S,?viet power or - the idealist line of thought - as "triumph"
of western ideas over those' of the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist mod-
el. These different views of the past also inform thinking about a
future Nato and security system for Europe. 28
The first, the "realist" view is the frame for a model based on a
restructured Na to. 29 In this vielv any stable peace presupposes
that the remaining Soviet military potential - l~hich in conven-
. - "
tlonal and nuclear terms i5 that of a formidable super power - be
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counterbalanced by a similar Western- force' even -if -at the lowest
possible level. This balancing force can be provided only wi th
U.S. help. Nato is the appropriate framework. But it has to adapt
to the changing nature of the Uni ted States -. European relation-
ship. That relationship is characterized, on the American side, by
a decline in leadership and commitment, -partly due to waning
domestic support; though America will remain, for reasons of its
own interest as outlined above, the Ult-imate or "last resort"
guarantor' of European securi ty. The inevi table American hegemony
in this asymmetrie seeuri ty rela tionship derives from America' s
overpowering nuelear position (as compared with Europe's) and from
tlle fact tha t in th-is sphere 11 Europe 11 does not exist: 1ii thin the
Nato frame the Uni ted States deals- more or 1ess bilaterally with a
loose eolleetion of individual small or medium-size European
states; only their military forces are integrated under U.S. eom-
mand. Hence, Ameriea's strategie concepts usually prevail. In the
eeonomie sphere, on the other hand, the Europeans are integrating
and grol~ing stronger to a posi tion of equali t~{ wi th the Uni ted
States; and at the same time they develop increasing sensibilities
about the eontinuing Ameriean military hegemony on which they de-
pend.
As solution for this di1emnla the "realist" model proposes to use
the integrative dynamies generated in the eeonomic sphere and
ereate a unified ~ajest European poli tical strueture lihich would
enable Europe to speak to the Uni ted Sta tes wi th one voiee. One
instrument available among others is the long-dormant West
European Union. If reaetivated it could beeome the vehicle for a
fully equal and cooperative European politieal and security rela-
tionship wi th the Uni ted Sta tes . Another could be the European
Community if it really deeided to push and expand its integrative
dynamism to include the poli tical and seeuri ty functions. 30 Nato
would then - on the basis of a new treaty concluded by two equal
partners - consist of these two "pillars", i. e. the Uni ted States
and an integrated and unified Western Europe. It might even be re-
named as has been suggested: ENATO I for European-North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, or EATO: European American Alliance.
-~
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The Uni ted sta tes would remain responsible for providing the nu-
clear shield of "last resort ", a role which flows logically from
the strategy decisions of the London Nato summit in 1990. It would
keep a symbolic troop presence in Europe and a rapid-buildup high-
ly mobile reserve force at horne. The European Nato pillar would be
responsible for regular security management within the (then)
agreed-upon (East-West, or CSCE) framework for troops, conven-
tional weapons and French and British nuclear forces.
This model has many advantages. The perennial debate about strate-
gy and burden-sharing31 would become 'easier: more equal~based,
presumably more open and rational. The institutional pressure for
compromise solutions would be maintained, probably expanded be-
cause it operates among equals.- The unified Germany would be tied
in by this restructured Nato even more strongly than by the old
one - because the new Nato is based on a genuine and closely knit
texture of poli tical uni ty. The irony or beauty of the thing is
that Gerrnany's very drive for greater (relative) autonomy vis-a-
vis the U.S. 32 would be the motor for creating European unity with
its binding effect on Germany because that is the only way to ob-
tain the desired au tonomy - collectively. Hence the model \~Ollld,
at the same time, avoid .. s ingularizing" German~/.- FinalI)' , the
danger for at least ''lestern Europe to relapse into the pre-1945
kind of international system is fairly remote under this model.
But what about Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? On
the present assumption Nato remains a traditional alliance direct-
ed at potential external threats, i.e. primarily the Soviet Uniop.
Pr~sident BushiS suggestion that Nato's "enemy today is uncertain-
ti-" and instabili ty" per se 33 would appear to be a somewhat ab-
s tract subs ti tute. A reinvigorated Na to could probably give the
Central and Eastern European states same associate or beneficiary
status under treaties creating a kind of security umbrella without
granting full membership: i.e. protection against the Soviet
threat, the German threat, and a combination of both i.e. of the
Hi tler-Stalin-pact type. 34 The device might satisfy the securi ty
needsof those states but not their collecti\'e ego - because it
does not accept them as full equal~.
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The Soviet Union has historically been a great European power, it
is a modern super power still that has lost the Cold War. It
should by all means be drawn into the European processes and be
treated as a legitimate member - not as a virus to be isolated or
marginalized. Even the (wrang) impression in Moscowof such inten-
tions could dangerously backfire. 35 To this end, (the new) Na to
should negotiate general mutual non-aggression pledges (as in
Paris), further specific bilateral agreements on arms reduction
and control and' their implementation, confidence-building - e.g.
more common open strategy discussions, perhaps common planning,
etc. A stronger new Nato would be a stronger partner for such
agreements; that alone might be considered an improvement over the
present situation. Soviet economic ties to the EC is another wide
and promising field. And all this can easily be fi t ted into the
newly expanding CSCE framework. Hence, one can hope to avoid
marginalization.
The weakness of this model, of course I is i ts somewhat utopian
character. West European poli tical union is not just around the
corner. So that the implications of what is specifically transito-
ry about this model need hardly be discussed here.
VII. European Collective Securitv
Technically, collective security provides security for all members
of a system against a securi ty threat arising inside the system
through collective action by all against the violator. It can, of
course, be combined' wi th alliance-type collective action against
external threats.
Is the inclusion of Central and East European states and of the
Soviet Union in such a sys"tem a realistic option today? Perhaps
not, though that also has b~en proposed. 36 Itmight be conceived,
however t as the resul t of a long process of incrementalsteps
enlarg~ng the security relationship between West and East Europe.
Each one step would make the following one somewhat easier. One
might better start wi th the old Nato because the high degree of,
political cohesion of the new Nato sketched under VI. would prac-
- ~tically obviate this present model. Art. 10 of the original North
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Atlantic Treaty allows for accession of any European state willing
to assurne the treaty obligations. -In such a process Nato would
probably undergo important changes: the poli tical, confli9t pre-
venting and resolving i.e. collective security function would take
precedence over the traditional alliance function. That would mean
reversing the old order of priorities.
This model follows the "idealist" interpretation of the present
situation. It assumes that the basis for Nato and its "victory"
(less over the other side than over the Cold War i tself) i9 the
homogeneity of the normative traditions and value system ("common
heritage and civilization") shared by all its members: democracy,
personal freedom, and the rule of law which the North Atlantic
Treaty pledges to develop and protect.
Along these lines it has. been argued that once these values w~ll
have been accepted in principle and in practice in Eastern Europe
including the Soviet Union, then - and only then - can all these
states be admitted into athen all-European collective security
system. 3?
However, to wait for - and expect soon - such complete homogeneity
in a Europe composed of states with so diverse histories and ex-
periences would be to put off the realization of this model inde-
finitely.
But a collective securi ty system may not necessarily presuppose
such homogeneity of political and social values. That may be
desirable but not necessary. If i t comes to that, there are im-
portant differences also among West European states and North
America. What would be required as a minimum would be what
H. Kissinger once called the" establishment of a "legi timate inter-
national system": i. e. consensus among participating states not
about substantive political and social values but, minimally,
about the' kinds of objectives astate should be able to pursue
internationally. Such a system _ leaves room for qui te same value
variations. Consensus is needed that foreign policy goals
whether in strictly security-military or in .broader political,
- ,
economic matters etc. - have to be limited, that they should not
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be destructive, i.e. should. not jeopardize the very existence of
another state or of the system as a·whole. 38
All the important advances made over the past few years:
unilaterally by the Soviet Union or the Uni ted States,
the WPO (soon to dissolve),
Nato at the Brussels and London meetings 1989, 1990
bilaterally by the Uni ted States and the Soviet Union:
TNF Treaty, START negotiations etc.
mUltilaterally: CNF and CFE treaties, CSCE Paris meeting
if taken together, hopefully would appear to point in one direc-
tion: the slow but continuing growth of a consensus that indeed
military action of any kind - certainly in the European theater -
is a mode of social behavior with dirninishing returns, is becoming
not only atavistic but collectively self-destructive. 39 This trend
would, of course, lessen the need for war prevention through al-
liances and hence strengthen the prospects of a collective secu-
rity system. And to the extent ~hat this insight begins to deter-
mine policy a "legitimate order" is or may be on its way to becom-
ing reali ty. Tha t would then be the founda tion for a European -
North Atlantic Collective Security System which transcends Nato's
tradi.tional basis in Western Europe only. There is no reason why
Central and East European states should then not become members I
with the Uni ted States and the Soviet Union serving as members and
ultimate guarantors of Europe's security from the fringes. Such a
role for both superpowers could be explained and made possible by
a) the - relative - decline of their global roles generally or b)
at least their - relatively - diminishing relevance for European
affairs 40 , or c) by the fact that they both have similar, parallel
or complementary interests in a stable, prosperaus, conflict-free
Europe. From the Soviet (and East or Central European) perspective
this interest is Europe's capacity to contain Germany and to pro-
vide reconstruction aid to the East; from the American, to bind
Germany, to act as a stable partner, and to prevent the Soviet
Union from disintegrat-ing. Ta the extent that it works such ar-
rangement would then also free Europe from hegemonie control of
the superpowers. 41
At the same time I the new collective security system does not
exclude closer cooperation - political, economic, securi ty, cul-
tural - among certain nations or subregional groups of nations. On
17
the contrary, a mul tiplici ty of regional and/or functional sub-
groups of nations, alliances, organizations, or institutions will
help to stabilize and to balance such future collective security
system which will finally merge into or just be the CSCE. Nato and
EC are the most obvious cases. But new combinations could be con-
strued and could be helpful: among the states of Central and
Eastern Europe located between Nato or EC (unless they join them)
and the Soviet Union, i.e. Poland, CSFR, Hungary; among those in
South East Europe; or around the Mediterranean in regional terms;
others for economic, ecological, cultural objectives, etc. 42
All that may appear utopian. But hope for this model is precisely
in the fact that it demands less in terms of immediate obliga-
tions, or transfer of sovereign rights, etc. And movement in that
direction will be further reinforced by growing awareness that the
goals of survival, security, or welfare cannot be pursued by
strictly compartmentalized and unilateral activities s~ch as pil-
ing llP resources for any' one of them, e. g. weapons for securi ty.
East and West have come to realize that these goals are embedded
in a cornplex web of multi-sector and multi-actor level interdepen-
dence 43 (The first concept refers to functional policy areas, the
other to types and levels of actors: private, transnational corpo-
rations, nation-states, international organizations or institu-
tions , etc). 80th sets of interdependencies are interdependent.
Given the cornplexity of the situation, _any attempt to attain the
major objectives: survival, security, welfare, can hope to succeed
only by cooperative modes of operation -or else all will stand to
loose. As a resul t, even the "unreformed" Na to is reported to be
considering a redefini tion of the very concept of securi ty as
referring to political as weIl as economic stability of all states
in Europe including the Soviet Union. 44
Which of these models to choose (if this were a matter of rational
choice)? Conventional prudence might call for the "realist" al-
liance model. Long-term trends, however, would appear to point ~o­
wards the all-European collective security model. It would - and
that is important - include those who by their own efforts have
rnoved European history full circle since 1945 - who have finally
giyen the Yal ta Declara tion on L:[bera ted Europe45 i ts true mean-
18
ing. Nei ther the So\'iet Union nor the lTni ted Sta tes nor anybodi'·
else \~Ollld be "singularized". And Nato (c,ld type) l~ill 11a\Te beconle
a useful instrument of the past .... *)
*} überarbeitete, erweiterte und ergänzte Fassung eines Vortrages,
den der Verf. im Dezember 1990 auf einer von der Universität
Lublin/Polen veranstalteten Konferenz I1The Transnational Future
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